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The Return of the Repressed?
South America in the Age of US Supremacy
JORGE ROGACHEVSKY
this time, South America fmds it
elf steeped in the quagmire of its
wn historical failures, a situation
fraught with both promise and danger. Economic chaos could give way to social chaos
and ultra-right political shifts. On the other
hand, new alternatives for progressive social change could emerge, at a time when
few such options appear to be taking root
anywhere else in the world. The United
States will certainly play a key role in any
future developments, just as it holds significant responsibility for the failures of the
past.
Three South American societies-Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela-show
the overall limitations of US policy towards
Latin America. Each in its own way threatens to dismantle the post-Cold War policy
framework developed by the United States.

US Historical Role as Co-Conspirator
To understand the present and what the
future might bring, it's important to recapitulate the role of the United States as a
co-conspirator in the history of atrocities
that precedes the current moment.
In the 1970s, an unprecedented challenge to US hegemony in Latin America
appeared. In South America, 1970 saw the
election of Salvador Allende, a Socialist
heading a left-wing coalition. Three years
later, Argentina's military rulers had to give
Vol. 11, #6

This was not the
path chosen. Starting with the overthrow ofAllende and
his replacement with
the brutal Pinochet
dictatorship in 1973,
the United States decided to fight the
revolutionary fire
spreading through
Latin America by
throwing dynamite
on the flames. The
result was an unprecedented wave of
Workers' solidarity movements have been rising in Argentina.
repression in a conGraphic courtesy of Centro de Midia lndependente
tinent with a long
and sad experience of dictatorial rule. More
way and allow the installation as president
than
3,000 people were disappeared and
of strong-man Juan Domingo Peron, after
killed
in Chile according to official acalmost 20 years in exile. Little links Peron
counts.
and Allende directly, except that historiAs military rule spread from Guatemala
cally both represent, from opposite poles,
to
Tierra
del Fuego, progressive social
a populist and nationalist resistance to US
movements
were dismantled, and revolucontrol of Latin America's economic and
tionary
movements
were stymied.
social resources.
In
the
1980s,
though,
new dangers maniThe United States could have taken nufested
themselves,
as
the
remedy used to
merous paths to confront these challenges.
fight
the
"disease"
of
social
transformation
In Chile, for example, the United States
began
to
have
unintended
side-effects.
could have accepted the democratic will
Military
corporatism
was
unstable.
It could
expressed by its people, and looked for
tilt
towards
left-leaning
populism,
as was
ways to engage constructively the governthe
case
with
Omar
Torrijos
in
Panama.
It
ment of Salvador Allende, a highly culcould
also
embrace
right-wing
nationalism,
tured, principled, and democraticallyminded political leader.
continued on page two
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The Return of the Repressed?
continued from page one

as the pampered Argentine military demonstrated. To stem a wave of increasing domestic unrest, the Argentine military decided to cash in its chips after having perfected the dirty war in the Southern Cone
and then moving on to train and advise the
Guatemalan army and the Nicaraguan
contras, by invading the Malvinas in 1982.
It took a full-scale war mobilization on the
part of the British-and major US intelligence support-to put the Argentine military in its place.
That place, however, could no longer
be as guarantors of the Pax Americana.
Moreover, as the Cold War reached its
whimpering climax, it would hardly do for
the United States to promote "democratization" in Eastern Europe while tying itself
to some of the most murderous governments on earth; neither was it sound policy
to continue investing US resources in militarizing Latin America and stifling not only
dangerous social change but also profitable economic activity. The US slowly distanced itself from its former military allies
and promoted a process of pacification and
democratization.
For the US government, the 1990s became the era of self-congratulatory posturing. The sudden and profound collapse of
·the former Soviet Union left the United
States as the sole military and economic
superpower. With progressive social
change effectively suppressed in Latin
America, the United States supported
democratic rule, which favored the return
to power of the traditional managerial political class or the traditional economic elites,
both of which sectors would ally themselves with neo-liberal economic policies.
The elements of the neo-liberal formula
were tightly interrelated:
1) Fight inflation by reducing government
spending and maintaining tight monetary
controls;
2) Reduce spending by decreasing public
services and reducing government employment;
3) Increase competition by divesting the
state of the public sector and reducing or
eliminating tariffs and duties;
4) Reduce the leverage of the labor movement
by reducing the size of the public workforce
and creating greater competition for jobs;
5) Promote investment confidence by reducing the cost of labor, maintaining tight
monetary controls, and granting major tax
concessions;
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Members of the Venezuelan Presidential
Guard raise the flag after a coup attempt
on Hugo Chavez. Photo courtesy of
Independent Media Center .Brazil

6) Fill in any threatening cracks in the neoliberal economic dike through a major program of state borrowing facilitated by the
implementation of measures 1-5.
That formula had led to the so-called
"economic miracle" in Chile, and the US
promoted it as the cure for a century of
economic woes in Latin America. And, for
a generation of technocrats uplifted by
Mary J?oppins' intonation that "a _spoonful
of sugar makes the medicine go down," the
neo-liberal medicine was coated with aveneer of democracy. It became a self-affirming mantra of US officialdom in the 1990s,
and into the beginning of this new century, that Latin America was now safely ensconced within the democratic camp (with
the salient exception of Cuba, of course).
This highly self-serving and optimistic
assessment has been severely tested in the
first months of the new century.
Colombia
. Colombia is in the throes of the longest-lasting military conflict in the Americas, a civil war that began almost 40 years
ago. Of the four major armed sectors in
Colombia today, the largest is the security
apparatus, consisting of about a quarter
million troops distributed among the military branches and the National Police. Confronting this apparatus are two major guerrilla organizations: the FARC (Fuerzas ArRESIST Newsletter

madas Revolucionarias de Colombia)
numbers 15-20,000 armed combatants, the
ELN (Ejercito de Liberaci6n Nacional) has
approximately 5,000 troops.
In addition to these more "traditional"
combatants, paramilitary organizations begun to crop up in the 1980s under the payroll of drug traffickers. Despite being declared illegal in 1989 due to their extreme
brutality, these forces have continued to
grow, and in 1997 merged into a unified
command known as the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), with approximately 8,000 combatants. The AUC
is the fastest growing armed group in Colombia, and by far the most bloodthirsty.
Even though all combatants in the Colombian conflict are accused of carrying out
atrocities, the Colombian Commission of
Jurists found that the paramilitaries were
responsible for 79 percent of the deaths and
disappearances of non-combatants in 2000,
compared with 16 percent for the guerrillas
and almost 5 percent for the military. 1 (The
relatively low level of atrocities directly ascribed to the Colombian military is not a
signal of its adherence to human rights
continued on page three
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The Return of the Repressed?
continued from page two

principles; even the US State Department
has acknowledged that there is often significant cooperation between military officers and the AUC.) In 2000 alone, over
26,000 people died as a result of the violence, or 1 out of every 1,500 inhabitants;
a comparable death rate from terrorist activities for the United States would have
produced 187,000 victims in this country.
Given the staggering level of violence
that the protracted armed conflict in Colombia has generated, and the very real
danger that the spiral could generate even
greater levels of atrocities, one might hope
that the US government would search for
a peaceful resolution to the decades-long war.
And in fact this is what the State Department
itself proposed in a May 17, 2001 report:
Support for the Colombian peace process remains a vital element of US
policy. Despite the slow progress made
to date, the peace process represents
Colombia s best chance to escape the
forty-year cycle of violence. A military
solution is not a viable option, as
Colombia sarmed forces are not strong
enough to defeat these groups of irregular forces with increasing income
from drug trafficking. 2
However, the last thing on the agenda,
in Washington and in Bogota, is negotiating with the rebels. The lame-duck government of President Andres Pastrana broke
off negotiations with the FARC last February and with the ELN in May. Each side
assigned the other with responsibility for
the breakdown of the peace process. In
May, Alvaro Uribe Velez won the election
after campaigning on a hard-line policy of
escalating the war against the guerrillas.
Uribe, who is to become president on August 7, 2002, is reputed to have received
support from the AUC during his campaign.
At the same time, the Bush Administration is set to fuel the Colombian fires even
further. On July 2, Otto Reich, Undersecretary
of State for Latin American Affairs, asserted
that Uribe will need "to take the war to the
guerrillas," according to the Los Angeles
Times. 3 The United States has already contributed almost $2 billion to Colombia's
military in the past five years, and Bush has
asked Congress for upwards of $500 million more for 2003. Colombia is the third
largest recipient of US military aid. In addition, the Bush administration has asked
Congress to expand the anti-narcotics foVol. 11, #6

cus of funding to include anti-terrorism.
These elements are familiar. In Colombia, the United States is following its CentralAmerican policies from the 1980s, fighting fire with dynamite. Given the regional
context surrounding Colombia, it becomes
clear why the United States has set its
sights so closely on that nation.
Just to the north lies Panama, still a ma-

riots left 277 civilians dead. Subsequently,
the Perez administration was accused of
corruption. In 1993, the Attorney General
indicted the president for misappropriation
of funds. The Supreme Court removed
Perez from office so that he could be tried,
and he was eventually found guilty.
Hugo Chavez spent two years in jail for
his participation in the failed coup attempt.

In Colombia, the United States is following
its Central American policies from the
1980s, fighti~g fire with dynamite.
jor trade and strategic resource for the US.
Wounds of the senior Bush Administration's
invasion of Panama in 1989 are still very
much open inside that nation. To the south
lies Ecuador and the promise of major oil
reserves. Ecuador has experienced severe
economic and social disruptions that have
brought about an ongoing political crisis.
No president has served out a normal fouryear term since 1996. The current president,
Gustavo Noboa, came to power after a
highly organized indigenous sector helped
force the resignation of the elected headof-state, Jamil Mahauada. And to Colombia's
east lies Venezuela, the third largest supplier of oil to the United States, and a country facing significant social upheaval.
Venezuela
Venezuela presents a different challenge
to the United States. If Colombia replays
the scenario made familiar in Central
America, Venezuela, in the figure of the
current president, Hugo Chavez, harks back
to the tradition of nationalist, charismatic,
ex-military leadership. Chavez is treading
the path of the aforementioned Trujillo and
Peron, looking to forge a policy independent of Washington's dictates and working on a foundation of grassroots support
as leverage to internal elite opposition.
Hugo Chavez came to prominence in
1992 when, as an officer in a paratroop regiment, he led an attempted coup against the
highly unpopular government of Carlos
Andres Perez. Perez's second presidential
term had begun inauspiciously in February 1989, when he attempted to implement
austerity measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Ensuing
RESIST Newsletter

However, the popularity of the attack
against a broadly reviled old-camp politician was demonstrated in 1998. Chavez
won the presidency of Venezuela with 56
percent of the vote. He then moved quickly
to capitalize on his momentum and charisma to push forward his "Bolivarian
Revolution." Chavez called for a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution,
and his supporters gained 121 out of 128
seats in the assembly. In 2000 Chavez was
reelected under the new constitution, this
time receiving almost 60 percent of the
vote to begin a six-year term.
Like Peron, Chavez seems to be attempting to implement a policy of independence
from Washington, looking for allies where
he can find them. When released from
prison in 1994 he visited and was warmly
received by Fidel Castro in Cuba; the two
maintain a warm relationship. After winning
his second bid for the presidency, Chavez
was the first head-of-state since the Gulf
War to visit with Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
Domestically, Chavez has consolidated his
government by implementing the constitutional revisions, maintaining grassroots
Bolivarian committees, reshuffling key executive appointments, as well as promoting tepid economic reforms in contrast to a
more combative rhetoric. James Petras, wellknow Latin American scholar, has summed
up Chavez's reforms as follows:
The key point to remember is Chavez s
record on domestic policy. Hes increased spending/or housing, schools,
and health. Hes increased income by a
small margin-3 or 4 percent. Hes increased taxes to some limited degree,
continued on page ten
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Plan Pueblo Panama Threatens Region
InterAmerican Development Bank Paves Latin America
BRENDAN O'NEILL

T

he InterAmerican Development Bank
(IDB) is literally paving the way for corporate globalization in Latin America with
the Plan Puebla Panama (PPP). The PPP,
and its southern twin, the Regional Infrastructure Integration Initiative (IIRSA), are
a new package of corporate-led development projects threatening the social and
ecological integrity of Latin America. The
IDB has recently crowned both the PPP
and URSA as their two priority "regional
integration" projects for Latin America.
The PPP and URSA, massive infrastructure projects, lay the foundation upon
which "free trade" can be built and expanded to encompass what is nearly the
entire geographical area of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA). The FTAA
proposes to extend the misery of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
to 34 countries in Central and South
America. The PPP and URSA are a package
of megaproj ects that include: the construction of hydroelectric dams in indigenous
territories, the dredging of deep water ports
in fragile ocean ecosystems, the paving of

high-impact roadways through indigenous
communities and currently intact rainforest
ecosystems, and the creation of sweatshops throughout the region. These
projects, coordinated by the IDB, will be
funded by a combination of sources, including development bank loans, private
corporations and public institutions.
The Central American Free Trade Agreements (CAFTA) is a complementary plan
to the PPP, also being pushed by the
InterAmerican Development Bank. As
Enrique Iglesias, President of the IDB remarked at a June meeting at its headquarters in Washington, DC, "A free trade agreement would strengthen Central America's
position as a destination for foreign investors interested in accessing the US market." Also present at the meeting were representatives from the more infamous corporate globalization institutions, including
the WTO and the World Bank, to discuss
and collaborate on plans for corporate globalization in Central America.
Any advancement in the PPP, URSA, as
well as CAFTA, is a step towards passing
the FTAA. Conversely, opposition and alternatives to any one of these free trade

plans offers the possibility of creating locally based, socially and ecologically just
alternatives. While the anti-globalization
movement has targeted, with reason, the
WTO, World Bank and IMF for their roles
as champions of globalization, there also
exist regional globalizers, including the IDB,
that need to be included as pressure points
in the social and ecological justice movements. Furthermore, while opposition to
the FTAA has been strong, there is a need
to expand analysis and awareness of the
relationships and interconnections between
the PPP, URSA, CAFTA and the FTAA.

Development for and by Whom?
Plan Puebla Panama (PPP) is a "regional
integration and development" project originally proposed by Mexico's President,
Vicente Fox, to create a link from Puebla,
Mexico, all the way to Panama with northsouth industrial and transportation corridors running along the Pacific Coast. The
PPP also proposes a series of"dry canals"
running east-west across Southern Mexico
and Central America as well as the creation
of key industrial development zones
throughout the region. Dry canals are high-

Reading the Alphabet Soup
Below is a partial listing of the abbreviated names relevant
to Colombia and US/transnational policy in the region.
CAFTA-The US/Central America Free Trade Agreement is
currently being negotiated. President Bush has referred to
CAFTA as a top priority for his administration, as it will help
move forward FTAA.
FTAA-Free Trade Area of the Americas is a proposed trade
agreement scheduled to be implemented no later than 2005
that will encompass the all of the Americas from Alaska down
to the tip of South America's Tierra del Fuego. Some opponents have called it "NAFTA on Steroids."
IDB-The InterAmerican Bank, the oldest and largest regional
multilateral development institution, was established in 1959
to "help accelerate economic and social development in Latin
America and the Caribbean" and is the main entity promoting the PPP as well as providing funding for the URSA.
IMF-International Monetary Fund, established in 1945, supplies member states with loans to help them overcome shortterm balance-of-payments difficulties. Such money is only
Page 4

made available after the recipients have agreed to policy
reforms in their economies through a structural adjustment
program.
URSA-Regional Infrastructure Integration Initiative, the
PPP's southern cousin, is a regional infrastructure development scheme for a large part of South America.
NAFTA-North American Free Trade Agreement is the major
trade agreement that went into effect in 1994 between the
US, Canada and Mexico which has cost tens of thousands
of workers in the US their jobs, lowered environmental standards and devastated communities throughout North
America.
PPP-Plan Puebla Panama is a massive regional infrastructure development scheme that is planned to go from Puebla,
Mexico all the way through Panama.
WTO-World Trade Organization, established in 1995, is a
powerful international body that develops and enforces rules
for trade and investment. It promotes the "free trade" agenda
of multinational corporations above the interests of local
communities, working families, and the environment.

RESIST Newsletter

July/August 2002

Plan Pueblo Panama Threatens Region
ways and railways that connect ports on
both coasts of the Isthmus, and threaten
to displace rural indigenous peoples and
destroy ecosystems of the region.
Officially, there are 8 initiatives of the
PPP: 1) Sustainable Development, 2) Human Development, 3) Natural Disaster Prevention, 4) Tourism Promotion, 5) Trade
Facilitation, 6) Road Integration, 7) Energy
Interconnection, 8) Telecommunications
Development. However, only two initiatives
seem to be drawing time or resources from
the Interamerican Development Bank: energy interconnection and road integration.
These two initiatives have received over
80% of total PPP investment thus far, demonstrating that they are the two most valuable plans for investment capital. The regional energy grid is being pushed and
primarily funded by the IDB and the Spanish multinational corporation ENDESA.
However, Applied Energy Services, Duke
Energy and Harken Energy are also jockeying for position to invest in the newly
privatized energy market.
The highway and infrastructure initiative is being funded by the IDB and World
Bank, among others. One of the most controversial highway projects includes a "dry
canal"(highway and high speed railway to
ship goods) that will run through the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Southern Mexico,
connecting the Pacific port of Salinas Cruz
with the Atlantic port of Coatzacoalcos.
Indigenous organizations such as the Organization of Indigenous Communities of
the Northern Zone ofthe Isthmus (UCIZONI)
ha e adamately rejected the Isthmus of
Tehuantepec dry canal declaring: "The Isthmus is not for sale!" Resistance to megaprojects by UCIZONI and other indigenous
groups had organized long before the PPP
was officially announced.
From March 4-18, 2002, Action for Community and Ecology in the Regions of Central America (ACERCA) led a fact-finding
delegation to Nicaragua's North Atlantic
Autonomous Region (RAAN). The indigenous communities living in the region are
currently threatened by specific projects
of the PPP. The expansion of the BilwiPuerto-Cabezas port could potentially
transform the port into the largest in the
Caribbean. A private US corporation calling itselfDELASA is amajorplayerbehind
this $150 million, three-part business plan
that threatens to irrevocably alter the entire region. DELASA revealed its plans to
Vol. 11, #6

Forests like this one near Rosita, Nicaragua are being decimated. If the PPP goes
through, the region may suffer more environmental devastation. Photo by Orin Lange/le/
ACERCA-ASEJ

the ACERCA delegation: enlarge and pave
the new Managua to Bilwi road, expand
and dredge the port, and displace nearby
communities to create an export-processing-zone in Bilwi-Puerto-Cabezas. Strong
indigenous resistance in the region to these
projects includes ACERCA's partners, the
Sumu/Mayagna indigenous community
organization SUKAWALA, and the Nation
of Mosquitia Consejo de Ancianos.

Resistance to the PPP
Critics of the PPP argue that, like the
FTAA and NAFTA, the PPP has been created by a handful of regional political and
corporate elites. They argue that the IDB
has intentionally excluded those who will
be impacted the most by the creation of
the project and point out that the IDB has
held only token "consultations" offered only
to hand-chosen organizations in the region.
With every proposal of the PPP, whether in
the form of a hydroelectric dam that displaces indigenous peoples, the privatization
of natural resources, the creation of sweatshops, or the construction of"dry canals,"
there is solidarity, resistance and alternatives being built from the bottom up.
For example, at the November 2001 forum
against globalization and the PPP held in Guatemala, Bertha Caceres, a Lenca indigenous
activist from the Civic Council of Popular
and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras, read part of the forums' final declaration:
For the men and women present at the
Xelaju Forum, the PPP is a ready-made
geopolitical project to build, in Mesoamerica, an area of services and infrastructure, designed according to the
RESIST Newsletter

logic oftransnational corporations, national oligarchy groups and international financial institutions. The central axes of this project are a services
infrastructure for the export of goods
and the exploitation of our natural resources, our bio-diversity and the labor of our peoples. The PPP does not
respond in any way to the social logic
of the Mesoamerican people and their
communities.
ACERCA participated in the third forum
against globalization and the PPP in
Managua, Nicaragua last month. At the
meetingACERCA coordinated an exchange
in Managua between the Atlantic Coast Indigenous peoples and another of
ACERCA's partner organizations, UCIZONI,
from Oaxaca, Mexico. The indigenous-toindigenous exchanges are an important part
of ACERCA's work. This exchange in
Managua will create a space for important
dialogue between indigenous communities
of the region to share common experiences
and coordinate action for mutual goals of
autonomy, self-determination and ecological justice in their communities.
Brendan O'Neill works at Action for
Community and Ecology in the Regions
of Central America (ACERCA), which
received a grant from RESIST this year.
For more information contact ACERCA
at acerca@sover.net, www.acerca.org.
Information from this article comes from
interviews with ACERCA partners and
DELASA representatives, "Supplement
E-bulletin ... " (March-April 2002)
available on line at www.interaction.org.
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Peace through Solidarity
CUSLAR Works to Change US Policy in Colombia
MARCIE LEY
avier Sanchez, a representative of the
Peace Community of San Jose de
Apartado, Colombia, spoke these words
during a recent visit to Ithaca, New York:
We made a decision: first, to defend our
lands and also to resist becoming involved in the war. It wasn 'tan easy decision to make or follow through with but
despite all ofour hardship, we know why
we are doing this and why we continue
with our struggle.
Part of a national tour organized by the
Fellowship of Reconciliation, Javier's stop
in Ithaca was sponsored by a local group,
the Committee on US-Latin American Relations (CULSAR). As the oldest continuously active solidarity organization in the
country, CUSLAR's mission is to raise
awareness about the effects of US policy
toward Latin America. We believe that one
of the most powerful means to educate
people about US foreign policy is to hear
the stories of those that are directly affected
by such policies. Javier's visit gave us a
first-hand perspective on the violence that
ravages his people.
Ask most people living in the United
States what Colombia is like and the inevitable reply is that it is a land of drugs, violence and guerrillas. For someone who pays
moderately close attention to the mainstream press this picture is fairly accurate,
for it is more or less all that is presented to
American audiences. But ask one of the
more than one million Colombians living
in the US to tell you something about their
homeland and you will be greeted by images of a country tremendously rich in terms
of cultural traditions, biological diversity,
and natural resources. This fierce national
pride may contrast starkly with the popular
image of a country plagued by violence. Yet
this richness lies at the heart of the 38-year
civil war that has driven so many from their
homes. Whether it be drugs, oil, human labor, access to markets, etc., Colombia has
something the rest of the world wants.

J

Plan Colombia is a Plan to Kill
For decades the US has maintained a
strong presence in Colombia and in other
Page 6

Andean countries under the pretext of fighting the War on Drugs. In the last several
years this involvement has largely taken the
form of direct military aid to the Colombian government. Ofthe $1.3 billion proposed
by the Clinton administration and allocated
by Congress in 2000 for Plan Colombia, the
overwhelming majority is designated for
military equipment and training. The rationale is that the guerrilla armies, most notably the FARC (Armed Revolutionary Forces
of Colombia), rely on narco-trafficking to
fund their revolutionary activities. Under
this logic, destroying the FARC would devastate the Colombian drug trade and significantly reduce the amount of cocaine and
heroin entering the US market.
For years critics have attacked the supply-side emphasis of the current drug policy
as expensive and ineffective. A RAND study
recently found that it is 26 times more cost
effective to use education and treatment to
address the drug problem in the US
(www.randorg). Furthermore, Colombia's cocaine production and export has increased
rather than diminished in recent years.
Meanwhile in the US the street price for
cocaine has gone down while purity has
increased. Clearly, if Plan Colombia's main
objective is to reduce the supply of drugs in
this country, billions of our tax dollars have
been squandered.
If we stop to consider where this money
goes we get a clearer picture. Of the $1.3
billion aid package, $600 million is designated
for the purchase of helicopters such as the
Blackhawk which is manufactured by
Sikorsky, a US-based defense contractor.
Another $350 million is allocated for maritime and aerial interception which often
takes the form of fumigation. The chemical
used in aerial spraying is glyphosate, known
as Ultra-RoundUp, and is manufactured by
the US-based Monsanto Corporation. And,
$96 million is budgeted to strengthen the
Colombian police forces which often receive training from their US counterparts.
What this breakdown means is that
more than half of the money allocated for
Colombia does not actually leave the US.
Rather, the majority of this aid to Colombia goes to pay salaries, purchase equipment and supplies, and contract services to
RESIST Newsletter

mostly US citizens and corporations. A
quick look at which interest groups (defense
contractors, chemical manufactures) and
elected officials (such as Sen. Joe
Leiberman of Connecticut, home of
Sikorsky) support such an aid package reveals what factors really determine our foreign policy. Given that the Bush administration has requested an additional $567 million in mostly military aid, the focus on militarization will undoubtedly continue to
dominate the strategy in Colombia.
For the people of Colombia, however,
the costs of militarization are extremely
high. In four decades of civil war, over
40,000 people have been killed, the majority of whom were civilians. In addition to
the one million people that have fled the
country, another 2 million have been internally displaced due to intolerable levels of
violence and oppression. As Javier pointed
out in his presentation to CUSLAR, to be
forced to leave one's land and move tourban slums with no means of self-sufficiency
and no community structure is so tragic that
many choose to remain and suffer the consequences.
While Colombia is indeed embroiled in
a civil war, and atrocities are committed by
all armed actors, it is impossible to place
blame primarily on the guerrillas. In fact,
70% of the violence is attributed to the paramilitary groups who carry out most of the
massacres of civilians. The main paramilitary
group, the AUC (Self-Defense Units of
Colombia) have been placed on the State
Department's list of known terrorist groups
(see "Picking our Enemies: US Doesn't
Mind Terrorists in Colombia," RESIST
Newsletter, May 2002). They share this distinction with the FARC, yet unlike the guerrillas the AUC maintains a close relationship with the Colombian Army. It is widely
acknowledged by paramilitary leaders and
Colombian government officials that without
this collaboration, the FARC would control
far more of the Colombian countryside.
"We stated our opposition [to Plan Colombia] from the beginning because we
knew that it is a plan to kill." Javier affirms what human rights reports-including those prepared by the US State Department-have documented: militarization leads to violence and the majority of
the victims are civilians. By supplying the
Colombian Army with weapons and training, while acknowledging their strong ties
to the paramilitaries, the US is essentially
July/August 2002

Peace through Solidarity
funding a war that Colombia is waging on
its own people.
They Want Us to Leave Our Land
During the 1980s and '90s, the FARC
maintained a strong presence in the northern Uruba area of what is now the Peace
Community of San Jose deApartado. Javier
remembers being offered guns by the guerrillas as an invitation to join their struggle.
Nearly everyone in the community refused
to take up arms. Shortly thereafter, the army
stepped up its repression of the FARC by
helping to create and support paramilitary
groups which also terrorized the community. Many of the residents fled, and it
wasn't until the community took the courageous step of declaring itself a Peace
Community that people started to return.
Those families who came back did so at tremendous risk to their lives, a sacrifice that
many were willing to make, having experi- .
enced the poverty and isolation of living
in urban slums. As Javier points out, "Coming back means returning to their homes
and lands and being able to work again."
Despite having declared neutrality, San
Jose de Apartado continues to suffer persecution. The community has seen 107 of
its members killed, 90% of them by the
paramilitaries. Recently, a paramilitary
group blocked the main road into the com-

munity, virtually paralyzing it economically.
As Javier points out, "The idea is that we
go hungry so that we abandon our lands.
Above all, there is economic interest in the
land." He explains that foreign interests
pres.sure the government of Colombia to
allow the establishment of mines and large
cattle ranches. "We also know well that
there are large projects being planned like
a dry canal that will link the two oceans."
While the location of San Jose de
Apartado is of strategic interest to many,
the same can be said about much of the
country. Control of Colombia's vast natural resources lie at the heart of the conflict.
The Bush administration's proposal to allocate $98 million to train a Colombian army
battalion to defend an oil pipeline owned
by Occidental Petroleum, based in Los
Angeles, is evidence of the link between
corporate interests and foreign aid.
As the FARC pointed out during the
recently suspended peace negotiations, the
civil unrest in Colombia will continue until
the underlying structural inequalities are
addressed. It is impossible to pursue peace
without alleviating poverty and inequality.
However, groups that express opposition
to governmental policy and are politically
more in line with the guerrillas have been
violently repressed. Assassinations of community and labor leaders, journalists, and

activists are common and contribute to a
general stifling of political dissent. Without the participation of civil society, democratic reform will remain elusive and Colombia will continue to be racked with violence. US lawmakers need to keep this in
mind when creating foreign policy.
CUSLAR operates under the assumption that a clearer understanding of what is
really happening in Colombia is necessary
to affect positive change. By sharing his
experiences with residents of our community, Javier inspires us to change what he
and the people of Colombia cannot-a US
foreign policy that is responsible for the
suffering and inequality of so many. He
offers us an opportunity to support
struggles for peace, justice, and
sustainability and reminds us that it is possible to create policies that will alleviate
poverty and injustice, promote peace and
respect for human rights in Colombia.
CUSLAR's job is to make his voice heard
as. loudly as possible.
Marcie Ley is Coordinator of the Committee on US-Latin American Relations
(CUSLAR), which received a multi-year
grant from RESIST For more information, contact CUSLAR, 316 Anabel
Taylor Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca,
NY 14850; www.rso.cornell.edu/cuslar.

They Can Walk With Their Heads Up
An Interview with MST Member Joao Pedro Stedile
CYNTHIA PETERS &
JUSTINPODUR

still powerful military, its high concentration of wealth and landownership, and its
struggle to develop under the weight of
immense debt and IMF-enforced neoliberal
economic policies have contributed to a
fractured and impoverished society.

A fter a recent visit to Brazil, Jean Ziegler,
J-\uN special rapporteur on the right to
food, said, "In Brazil, where there is fertile
land, wealth and a tropical climate, hunger
is not a destiny." Rather, it is "the product
of a totally unjust order. Those who die of
hunger in Brazil are assassinated."
Brazilian government officials were outraged by Ziegler's strong words, and
pointed to their recent successes in improving health care and education, and in lifting millions out of extreme poverty. Still,
the government does not dispute the fact
that 40,000 Brazilians die every year of hunger and malnutrition-related diseases, and
that more than 23 million of Brazil's 170 milVol. 11, #6 .

- ~~
The sign reads: "No USA, resistance is
necessary, long live Brazil!" Photo by
Rabble, courtesy Brazil Independent Media Center

lion people are malnourished.
How has Latin America's most resourcerich country ended up with such a large
part of its population struggling to survive?
Brazil's recent decades of dictatorship and
RESIST Newsletter

Historical Context
In the early 1960s, populist president
Joao Goulart antagonized the US-allied Brazilian military by instituting rent controls,
seizing unused lands, nationalizing the
petroleum industry, and restricting the repatriation of profits by foreign investors.
Brazilian generals staged a coup in 1964,
ushering in a 21-year military dictatorship
that violently suppressed opposition political parties, independent labor unions,
continued on page eight
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Interview with MST Member Joao Pedro Stedile
continued from page seven

student movements, and landless workers'
organizations. It also presided over the socalled Brazilian economic miracle--a dozen
or so years of rapid growth financed by
loans from foreign banks. This left the general population a legacy of huge interest payments and punitive economic policies.
After a sustained economic crisis in the
1970s and early 1980s the military dictatorship signed an austerity agreement with
the IMF in 1983. Being the world's largest
debtor nation affected Brazil's poor in predictable ways. In order to generate cash to
make interest payments on the debt, more
and more land was put towards cash crops
like coffee and soy, displacing hundreds
of thousands of subsistence farmers.
Many fled to the cities, where they settled
in burgeoning shantytowns. Others were
relocated to places such as the Amazonian
Rondonia, where they cleared forests in an
effort to farm the land. Brazil suffers not just
from its immense foreign debt, but also from
the hidden costs of environmental destruction, many internally displaced people, and
an impoverished rural population-what
many Brazilians call the "social debt."
Progressive Resistance
Unions and the fragments of the Brazilian left that had survived 15 years of dictatorship founded the left-wing Workers'
Party (PT) in 1979. [In subsequent years]
grassroots social change movements grew,
such as the Landless Workers' Movement
(Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem
Terra, or MST), and of opposition political
parties such as the PT. Since the return to
elections in 1988, the PT bas won key state
and local elections, and instituted important reforms.
The MST, with support from the Catholic Church, began its struggle in 1985, taking over an unused plantation in the south
of the country. The occupiers gained title
to the land two years later. Since then, the
MST has helped 300,000 families settle on
previously idle land, while close to 100,000
other families are living on land they have
occupied, waiting for government recognition. In May 2000, 30,000 MST members
took over federal buildings across the country in a successful bid to persuade President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to address the country's extreme economic inequality. In response to pressure from the
MST, Cardoso promised $1 billion in rePage 8

Marchers carry a banner at the World Social Forum protest in Porto Alegre, Brazil about
the protest against the FTAA/ALCA meetings in Buenos Aries, Brazil. Photo by Rabble,
courtesy of Brazil Independent Media Center

forms. In addition to its successful resettlement program and considerable grassroots
power, the MST boasts a sophisticated literacy program for adults and adolescents,
as well as 1,000 primary schools.
The MST is not popular among certain
segments of Brazilian society. The police
and military, as well as landlords' private
gunmen, still target activists. According to
the Roman Catholic-run Pastoral Land
Commission, over 1,100 people were killed
in land disputes between 1985 and 1999.
And only 47 cases have gone to trial, leading to just 18 convictions.
In addition to violent repression, the
MST faces other challenges. According to
Global Exchange, "landowners and some
elected officials are trying to repeal the
clause of the Brazilian constitution that
says land should be used for social purposes-and can be redistributed if it is not.
That provision has formed the legal foundation of the MST's occupations of unused lands." Furthermore, the World
Bank's $2 billion "land bank" program,
which offers loans to small farmers to purchase land, is transparently designed to
undermine the grassroots-based MST. Today, 3% of Brazil's population still owns
two-thirds of the country's arable land,
much of which lies idle. Meanwhile, millions of peasants struggle to survive by
working in temporary agricultural jobs.
While in Herval, in the southern state
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of Rio Grande do Sul, Canadian activist and
writer Justin Podur and I had the opportunity to talk with Joao Pedro Stedile, a member of the MS T's national board.

-Cynthia Peters
What are the MST's main achievements?

JPS: Our most important success of all
has been to build an organization and a
social movement. We've won back the
worth and dignity of the peasant. That
has immeasurable value. It doesn't show
up in statistics. But when a person stops
being humiliated, stops being a slave,
and they can walk with their head up,
master of their own future, that's the
most important thing we're building.
Beyond that, over the last 18 years,
we've gptten land for 300,000 families, and
though many of them remain poor, nobody
in our settlements goes hungry. Everybody
has work all year around. There are schools
in all the settlements. All the children go to
school. Everyone can build their own
home. The houses may be humble, but nobody has to pay rent to anyone. At the
very least, the people enjoy the basic rights
of all people. That's what retaking the land
means.
We're not satisfied with these modest
achievements. Because in Brazil there are
four million landless families. Our struggle
continued on page nine
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is to broaden the movement, open up more
battles, mobilize more people, because it's
not just a matter of allowing a few people
to solve their problems. This is important,
of course. It offers an example. It's a form
of mass education. But the fundamental
thing is to change society, and solve the
problems of all Brazilians, of all the poor.

You spoke of changing society. What are
the next steps for the MST?
JPS: The challenges are huge. It's not
going to be an easy struggle, nor a quick
one. The road ahead will be rocky, not
smooth. But there are both long-range
struggles and more immediate ones.
In the long term, we're doing battle
over what may decide the future of our
country. I'm talking·about the US
offensive to impose the Free Trade Area
oftheAmericas (FTAA) on the Americas
as a whole. The FTAA is more than a
trade agreement. It is the US government's
plan to control our land, our wealth, our
development, our technology, our
currency, and our language. It would
mean our submission to the interests of
US capital-to the less than 500 corporations at the top. And if that happens,
we're back to being a colony, this time
under the rule of the United States. So we
have to fight to keep the FTAA from
being imposed on Brazil. And not just on
Brazil, but on the whole of Latin America.
What we're going to do over the course
of the coming months and years is help
inform the people, organize them, raise
their consciousness. In addition to
fighting for land, health, and shelter, we
have to stop the FTAA. That's going to
mean demonstrations, mass meetings,
lots and lots of different initiatives to
inform and politicize people. Beyond that,
every social movement has to continue
its own specific work- we in the landless
movement have to keep on occupying
more and more landed estates. Our
compatriots who have been displaced by
dam construction will keep on fighting
against the dams. The unemployed
movements in the city will broaden their
struggles for employment. The workers
who are threatened will keep organizing,
like for the general strike this March.
We're going to try and promote all these
struggles in hopes of reawakening the
Vol. 11, #6

[W]hat gratifies us the most is hearing
about the people in the United States, even
if they're not a majority yet, who are
mobilizing as well, and fighting against
their government.
people and reviving the mass movement
here in Brazil. Because right now it's receding. With a revival of the mass movement,
we can hope to change the government,
and the reigning economic model.

that teaches people that they have a right
to a say.

What do you think of the Workers' Party's
participatory budget process?

JPS: We're very interested in US social
movements. The landless movement
enjoys the support of solidarity committees in many US cities, which help us and
help publicize our efforts. But what
gratifies us the most is hearing about the
people in the United States, even if
they're not a majority yet, who are
mobilizing as well, and fighting against
their government. We understand that
the people of the United States don't
know the real impact of the actions of
their government. We hope that, slowly,
they will begin to realize that, as peoples,
we're the same. It's like an old US
journalist put it. He was a "cousin" or an
"ancestor" of you who have come here
from the United States. And he really said
it in your honor. Because he was a social
activist, and he went to cover the ·
Spanish Civil War, like you have come
here to Porto Alegre. When he came
back, he wrote a book, which was called
No Man is a Foreigner-meaning "man"
in the general sense. What does that
mean? That all peoples are alike. It's
governments and capital, which enriches
itself from the labor of others, that are
bad. So we have to build a great, international alliance, which is what this forum is
for. And we hope and expect that US
activists, fighting in the dragon's own
gut, will help us kill this monster.

JPS: Well, there are some positive things
about it, but also some criticisms to make.

What are the criticisms?
JPS: That, in the end, the people really
only have a say over 5%-or, at the
most, 10%-of the budget. Because the
rest- including salaries, foreign debt
payments, etc.-is fixed by law. All public
budgets in Brazil have 13 % of the total
tied up by the IMF. They're required to
deposit this in the bank to pay the debt.
So, for example, in this state, which is
governed by a people's government, by
the left; education gets 11 % of the
budget, while the IMF gets 13%. That
means the power of the people to change
things through the participatory budget
process is very limited.

So, what's the positive side?
JPS: It's that the participatory budget
creates an opportunity for the people to
voice their opinions. For the people to·
have a say about the overall problems of
their society. It's like an exercise that
points toward creating a general assembly of the society as a whole. Here in Rio
Grande do Sul, we have a population of
12 million. You can't fit 12 million people
into a single room. But the idea of the
participatory budget process is that
everyone can take part and have a say.
So the main value of the process is not
how much of the budget people have a
say over, but as a democratic exercise
RESIST Newsletter

What would you say to activists and social
movements in North America?

This article was translated from Spanish
by Alejandro Reuss and excerpted from
Dollars & Sense (May/June 2002). For
more information, contact Dollars and
Sense, 740 Cambridge Street, Cambridge,
MA 02141; www.dollarsandsense.org
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so that the upper classes pay something,
rather than nothing.
But for all this, he has also deregulated the financial system. Spanish
banks have become very involved in
the deregulated system. He privatized
Caracas s[sic} electrical system. US oil
companies haven't been hinderedthey pay slightly more on the petroleum
tax. In other words, theres been no radical or even moderate redistribution of
income. There has been no expropriation ofany property-except unutilized
farmland thats paid for in cash. Thats
about the most conservative land reform you'// see anywhere in Latin
America-market prices for the land,
paid in cash. 4
Despite this moderate program of economic reform, _Chavez has generated unyielding opposition from Venezuela's economic elite. Quoting Petras again:

Chavez is a nationalist in foreign
policy and a social liberal in domestic
policy. From year one, he has been in
favor ofclass collaboration. The opposition isn't interested in any kind of
class collaboration- they want it all.
The Venezuelan opposition is in a position to reject any kind of collaboration with
the Chavez government precisely because
the latter's nationalist foreign policy has
put him on a collision course with Washington. Despite the lip-service given to the
support of democratic leadership in Latin
America, and Chavez's unquestioned credentials as a democratically elected leader,
the US government has put out very clear
signals that his ouster by undemocratic
means would find favor.
Such a scenario played itself out on April
11. After months of conspiring, much </ it
done through meetings at the US embassy
in Caracas, an anti-Chavez rally turned violent and culminated with the death of 14
protesters. The Chavez opposition saw an
opportunity to act and, with expectations
of support from the Venezuelan military and
the US government, quickly moved to arrest Chavez and declare an end to his government and the Bolivarian Revolution.
Washington, in fact, did play its assigned
role, with statements blaming Chavez and
indicating support for his ouster.
The coup quickly unraveled, though.
Externally, L~tin American leaders, then
meeting in Costa Rica, sharply rebuked the
Page JO

Women bang pots during a protest in
Argentina. Photo courtesy of AP

undemocratic ouster of Chavez. In a rare sign
of independence, Latin American politicians,
including Bush's strong ally, Vicente Fox of
Mexico, broke with Washington in a very
public manner. This swift, strong action ensured that Washington's statements of support of the new government in Caracas never
turned into direct recognition.
Internally, the new government, headed
by Pedro Carmona, head of the business confederation F edecamaras, overplayed its hand,
dismissing the National Assembly and the
Supreme Court and declaring void the 1999
constitution. Carmona's heavy-handedness
apparently alienated his military backers.
They began to move away, allowing Chavez
supporters within the armed forces to regroup
and mobilize. At the same time, Chavez's
grassroots supporters within the lower classes
came out in mass to counter the middle-class
opponents who had staged the April 11
march. All of these fast-moving developments led to Chavez's reinstatement on April
13.
Since then, the situation has continued to
be highly charged. After Chavez reassumed
office, Bush Administration officials sent out
public warnings that it was best for him to
mend his ways. Former US president Jimmy
Carter traveled to Caracas in early July, 2002,
to mediate between the factions. But despite
Chavez's offer to allow the Organization of
American States and the United Nations to
participate in further mediating efforts, the
opposition failed to turn out to discussions
sponsored by Carter. As part of the failed
Carter-led discussions, Chavez had offered
to the opposition that he would allow his
presidency, which is not set to expire until
2006, to be placed before a referendum in
2003.
Opposition to Chavez continues to press
on.AJuly 11 rallytocommemoratetheApril
11 events brought out as many as 200,000
RESIST Newsletter

people; this time no violence erupted. The
Venezuelan Supreme Court has also used
a loophole in the law to open the way for
Chavez's possible indictment for alleged
campaign financing irregularities. And, the
main labor confederation, the CTV
(Confederaci6n
de
Trabajadores
Venezolanos) is reaching out to the Church,
the political opposition, and business and
academic groups to promote a call for a
national strike to press for Chavez's resignation. Meantime, Chavez is calling on
his supporters to come to his defense.
It is unclear how much longer Chavez
will be able to traverse the political
minefield placed at his feet. If he can
weather the current crisis, fend off the internal opposition, consolidate his support
within the armed forces, keep Washington
at bay, and reinvigorate his popular backing, he will have emerged stronger for having been tested in this fashion. It will then
be seen whether he can take the next step
and move beyond his nationalist and populist rhetoric to promote a program of radical
social reform.

Argentina
Meanwhile, at the far end of the continent, in Argentina, unprecedented crisis and
potential have emerged, as the second-largest
country in South America- and in the 1990s
the darling of the neo-liberal prophets- has
run aground economically.
In the 1990s, Argentina moved to stem
one of the worst cases of hyperinflation in
history by pegging the peso to the dollar. At
the same time, it followed the IMF prescription of privatizing its state sector and significantly reducing public spending. But, after
an initial influx of capital from privatization,
the Argentine economy begun to stall as it
experienced the reverberations of economic
shocks in Mexico, Asia, Russia, and Brazil.
As investment capital began to dry up, and
Argentine exports suffered due to an overpriced peso, the Argentine government of the
Peronist Carlos Menem parlayed its good relationship with Washington and the IMF into
government loans intended to prop up its
sagging economy- generating a foreign debt
of $132 billion, the largest in the world.
Borrowing from Peter in order to pay
Pablo was a sure formula for Argentina to
secure short-term solvency by delaying an
inevitable financial collapse. The collapse
hit in December 2001. Even though IMFimposed austerity measures had generated
July/August 2002
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an official unemployment rate of around 20
percent, IMF pressures continued. Despite
Argentine government pleas to ease up
and provide short-term reliefin the form of
capital it could use to service an impending debt payment, the IMF continued to
apply a political and economic tourniquet.
Neo-liberal pundits in the United States
went on the attack, declaring that the Argentine crisis was due to a profligate population that was unwilling to tighten its belt
and meet its debt obligations.
Backed into a comer, and facing severe
capital shortage and a run on the banks
that had generated over $1 billion in withdrawals at the end ofNovember, in December the Radical Party government of
F emando de la Rua imposed a limit on bank
withdrawals of 250 pesos a week. The government also announced that privatized
pension funds would be replaced by government bonds in order to free up capital
to continue servicing the debt. These measures provoked the middle class to join the
working class, whose leadership had called
for a general strike in mid-December.
Massive unrest broke out in Argentina's
major cities on December 19, leading to de
la Rua's resignation on December 20 when
the army refused to come out in support of
his government. After ten tempestuous
days that saw the exit of three provisional
presidents, Congress selected Peronist
Senator Eduardo Duhalde, de la Rua's main
opponent in the 1999 elections, to complete
de la Rua's term. Duhalde, however, has
been equally unable to stem the economic
collapse and the popular unrest. He did win
concessions from provincial governors to
reduce transfers from the national budget,
but the IMF has continued to maintain pressure, announcing in early July that a team
of advisors would travel to Argentina at
the end of the month to suggest ways of
reforming the banking sector, but refusing
to extend hope that a new influx of capital
would be forthcoming.
The Bush administration appears intent
on maintaining a hard-line policy, intoning
the neo-liberal mantra that Argentina's
problems are its own fault. Not so, according to Columbia University professor Joseph Stiglitz, former vice-president and
chief economist at the World Bank, and
winner of the 2001 Noble prize in economics:
The disaster comes not from not listening to the IMF, but rather from listening. ... Given the exchange rate, given
Vol. 11, #6

the economic depression which the IMF
po/ides had already brought about,
given the huge debt, given that the IMF
did not provide any convincing economic strategy to get out of the mess,
given that there were open capital markets so that anyone who wanted to could
move their investments to safer havens
elsewhere in the world, it was highly
unlikely that anyone-especially when
the government signed an agreement to
reduce its deficit further, predictably
causing more unemployment and lower
output-would start investing more. 5
Given the absence of new capital resources, Argentine bank deposits have remained frozen. Many in the middle class
have lost most of their life-savings, and the
devalued peso has lost more than 70 percent of its value since the beginning of
2002. With greater austerity measures signaled, the working class, and in particular
the unemployed, have also been severely hit.
The one bright light in the cavernous
pit into which Argentine society has fallen
is that the mobilization which brought
down the de la Rua government in December has remained unabated. Currently, the
government is experiencing a wave of recurrent actions as a result of the death of
two unemployed youth in a confrontation
with police during a protest action on June
26. On July 9, Argentina's Independence
Day, 35,000 people marched on the Plaza
de Mayo, where the president's palace is
located. This was the second mass demonstration in as many weeks, with a third
one called for the third week in July. These
demonstrations have brought together sectors of the labor movement, the unemployed, human rights groups, left-wing
political parties, students, and neighborhood committees which emerge~ from the
December mobilizations.
There are also ongoing expressions of
a developing alliance between "piqueteros
y cacerolas" (strikers and potters-the latter referring to the practice of middle-class
housewives of banging pots as a sign
of protest which originated in Chile
against the Pinochet regime), calls for
"una segunda independencia" ( a second
independence movement), and the removal of president Duahlde and the
IMF. Given this ongoing pressure,
Duahlde, with the clear backing of the
Bush Administration, has called for
early elections in March 2003 to release
RESIST Newsletter

some pressure from the cooker.
What Lies Ahead?
It is unclear where Argentina's deepening political and economic crisis, combined
with mounting popular mobilization, will
lead. So far, the military has remained at the
margin, but, as is clear in Colombia and
Venezuela, the Bush Administration's commitment to peace and democracy in Latin
America is an easily discarded rhetorical
posture. Will the growing unrest in Argentina lead to the development of a broadbased grassroots political movement that
will challenge the political and economic
status quo? What response would be generated from the Argentine oligarchy, political class, military, and the US government?
And what will be the impact from other regional developments, in particular the October elections in Brazil, where Worker's
Party candidate, Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva
(Lula) is the front-runner? The unpredictability of current circumstances suggests
that there is much to watch for in Argentine developments.
Colombia, Venezuela, and Argentinaeach in itself, and all three togetherclearly point to the imminent potential for
deepening conflict in South America. They
also raise the possibility that a new century may indeed bring about a new beginning for people in Latin America.

Jorge Rogachevsky is a member of
RESIST's Board of Directors and teaches
Spanish and Latin American Studies at
St. Mary's College of Maryland.
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Resist awards grants six times a year to
groups throughout the United States engaged in activism for social and economic
justice. In this issue of the Newsletter we
list a few grant recipients from our June
2002 allocation cycle. For information, contact the groups at the addresses below.

Committee in Solidarity
with Central American
· People (CISCAP)
458 Blair Blvd. , Eugene, OR 97402
ciscap@efn.org
CISCAP has organized for the past 20
years to counter US economic and military interventions across Latin America.
In the last year, CISCAP branched out to
facilitate a number of coalitions focusing
on immigrant and economic justice issues
and started a Colombia Interest Group in
response to US Plan Colombia. CISCAP
has been very successful at emphasizing
the relationships between unjust economic and social policies within the US
and in Latin America.
Resist awarded CISCAP $2,000 for
general support for their work around
eentral American solidarity organizing.

Filipino American Coalition
for Environmental Solutions
16 West 32nd Street, Suite 10B2
New York, NY 10001
www.facessolutions. org
The Filipino American Coalition for Environmental Solutions (FACES) operates
nationally through local chapters to
engage Filipino American communities in
organizing around the environmental
effects of US military bases in the Philippines. Through their military base cleanup campaign, FACES hopes to increase
the capacity ofFilipino communities to
take political action against environmental racism.
Resist awarded FACES a $3,000 grant
for general support.

Seattle Young People's Project
123 21st Avenue, Seattle, WA 98122
www.sypp.org
For the last 10 years, the Seattle Young
People's Project (SYPP) has been empowering youth for social change in their
own communities by providing a supportive framework for youth-led organiz-

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Join the Resist Pledge Program!
We'd like you to consider
becoming a Resist Pledge.
Pledges account for over 30%
of our income. ·

So take the plunge and become a
Resist Pledge! We count on you,and
the groups we fund count on us.
I'll send you my pledge of $_ _
every month/quarter/six months/year
(please circle one).

•
•
•

Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Resist • 259 Elm Street • Somervme • MA • 02144. Donations are tax-deductible.

•
••

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Page 12

RESIST Newsletter

5808 Wexford Lane
Knoxville, TN 37921; Jay8@icx.net
The Southeast Regional Welfare Rights
Network is a newly emerging organization that seeks to organize a cohesive
force to change welfare policy on both
the state and federal levels. Coming from
a perspective that organizing for justice
in the South requires a unique set of
strategies, the Regional Network will
work throughout the area to challenge
TANF and other welfare policies.
Resist awarded the Southeast
Regional Welfare Rights Network $2,000
to hold the first welfare rights conferences in the South organized by
grassroots organizations.

PO Box 12261
Albuquerque, NM 87195

By becoming a pledge, you help guarantee
Enclosed is an initial pledge
Resist a fixed and dependable source of
contribution of $_ _ _ .
income on which we can build our grantmaking program. In return, we will send
Please automatically deduct my
you a monthly pledge letter and reminder
pledge from my credit card (below).
along with your newsletter. We will also
I can't join the pledge program
keep you up-to-date on the groups we
now,
but here's a contribution of
have funded and the other work being
$___ to support your work.
done at Resist.
Name _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

•

Southeast Regional Welfare
Rights Network

Young Women United

•

Phone Number (for confirmation only) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Visa/Master Card# _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Expiration Date _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

ing. SYPP allows young people the opportunity to initiate and implement their
own organizing projects. Through the
Youth Undoing Institutional Racism
Project, youth organizers are working on
a two-pronged campaign: confronting
institutional racism within their own
schools while countering military recruitment at Seattle's Public Schools.
Resist awarded the Seattle Young
People's Project $3,000 for their Youth
Undoing Institutional Racism Project.

Young Women United is a new organization founded by and for young women to
protect and build the organizing strength
of young women of color. Through their
Circle of Strength program, Young
Women United offers training and leadership development for teenage women to
organize around health and violence
issues in their lives. The program serves
to raise consciousness of the multiple
oppressions encountered in young
women's lives, while empowering them to
take action within their communities.
Resist awarded Young Women United
$3,000 for the Circle of Strength program.
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